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A Martingale Test for Alpha
Dean P. Foster, Robert Stine, and H. Peyton Young
December 31, 2008

We present a new method for testing whether a fund manager’s track record allows us to
infer that he is able to beat the market with high probability or is just plain lucky. The
test is based on the martingale maximal inequality. Unlike other standard approaches the
test is robust to the assumed distribution of returns while retaining substantial statistical
power. The method is illustrated using stock market data from 1926‐2007.

1. Estimating alpha

Fund managers who deliver returns that are consistently higher than the returns
from a market portfolio are said to generate ‘alpha’. This is the extra return
attributable to the manager’s superior investment skill. Needless to say, such
managers are in great demand and many of them earn large sums of money. But
how can investors tell whether a given manager actually is able to generate
positive alpha over an extended period of time?

The usual method for estimating alpha empirically is to regress a given series of
returns generated by a fund manager against the returns generated by a market
portfolio, such as the S&P 500.

Let t = 0,1, 2,3,... be discrete times at which

returns are reported, say the end of each month.

Consider first a fund that is

invested entirely in the stock market, and let rt m be the return generated by the
market portfolio in period t . Let rt f be the risk‐free rate of return in period t ,
that is, the return available on a safe asset such as US Treasury bills. The excess
1

return in the period is rt m − rt f . Let us compare this with an alternative managed
portfolio that generates returns rt p and associated excess returns rt p − rt f ,

t = 1, 2,3,... . The usual way to estimate the manager’s “alpha” ‐‐ his contribution
to excess returns due to superior skill ‐‐ is to estimate a linear regression equation
of form

rt p − rt f = α + β (rt m − rt f ) + ε t .

(1)

If the estimated value of α is positive at a high level of statistical significance
(using the t‐test for the intercept), we conclude that we should put at least some
of our money into the alternative portfolio. This follows from the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), which we shall discuss in more detail in section 7 (see
Berndt, 1996; Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997). However, the t‐test is only
valid if the errors ε t satisfy standard assumptions, in particular, they should be
independent and normally distributed with mean zero and identical variance.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to think that in reality the errors will be so
distributed.

The problem is that the manager’s investment strategy (for the

alternative portfolio) may be designed so that the errors are not i.i.d. normal. In
particular, it can be shown that under standard performance fees, managers have
an incentive to follow investment strategies whose returns distribution is skewed
with a fat left tail (Foster and Young, 2007). In such cases the use of the t‐test is
problematic.

The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate an alternative test for alpha that
makes no parametric assumptions about the distribution of the fund’s returns. It
is simple to compute and can even accommodate the possibility that the manager
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is deliberately trying to deceive the investor by creating return series that look
good, i.e., that are designed to fool the t‐test. All of this comes without much
sacrifice in power, as we show in section 5.

2. A martingale model of investment returns

The key idea is to show that the space of possible investment strategies –
including positions in options and other derivatives ‐‐ can be represented at a
high level of generality by a family of martingales. We will then apply the
martingale maximal inequality to test for the presence of positive alpha. The null
hypothesis will be that the manager has no special investment skill and cannot
deliver long‐run excess returns that are higher than the excess returns generated
by the market portfolio (alpha equals zero).

This is a natural assumption

because, in a competitive market, one would normally expect that there are
relatively few arbitrage opportunities and relatively few individuals who are
able to take advantage of the few opportunities that there might be.

First we need some notation. Consider a market portfolio that begins at size 1.
By the end of period t it has grown by the factor (1 + rt m ) . Define the ratio

X t = (1 + rt m ) /(1 + rt f ) ≥ 0 .

(2)

This is the multiplicative excess return delivered by the market portfolio relative to
the risk‐free rate. Similarly the multiplicative excess return delivered by the
alternative managed portfolio is
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Yt = (1 + rt p ) /(1 + rt f ) ≥ 0 .

(3)

If we define Yt = M t X t , then M t ≥ 0 is the factor by which the manager over‐
performs (or under‐performs) the market portfolio in period t. We shall refer to

M t as the multiplicative excess return of the alternative portfolio relative to the market.

This set‐up turns out to be convenient from a mathematical standpoint. It is also
quite general: virtually any investment strategy yields returns that can be
represented as a nonnegative martingale M t ≥ 0 . If a manager has no particular
investment skill (alpha is zero), his choice set consists only of those nonnegative
martingales M t whose conditional expectation is 1. A skilled manager has a
larger choice set that includes martingales with conditional expectation greater
than 1; in fact we can take the size of the choice set as a general definition of
“managerial skill”.

Suppose that we observe a series of realized returns from a market portfolio and
also from an alternative portfolio over the periods t = 1, 2,..., T . Since we know
the risk‐free rate in each period, we can compute the t th ‐ period realizations

xt , yt , mt respectively of the random variables X t , Yt , M t . The null hypothesis H 0 is
that the manager of the alternative portfolio is not generating positive alpha, that
is,

H 0 : ∀t , E[ M t | x1 ,..., xt −1 , m1 ,..., mt −1 ] = 1 .

4

(4)

Compound Excess Return Test (CERT).

Ct = M 1M 2

For each

t , 1 ≤ t ≤ T , let

M t ≥ 0 be the compound excess return of a fund through period t relative

to the market. The probability that this series was generated by a manager who cannot
beat the market is at most min1≤t ≤T (1/ Ct ) .

Corollary. A manager’s performance over a given period of time allows us to infer that
he can beat the market with 95% confidence provided his portfolio grows by a factor of at
least twenty‐fold relative to the total growth of the market portfolio over the same period.

The proof is a straightforward application of the martingale maximal inequality
(Doob, 1953), which for convenience we shall derive here.

Proof sketch. Under our assumptions, the compound excess return generated
through period t , Ct , is a nonnegative martingale with conditional expectation 1
in every period. Given a real number γ > 0 , define the random time T (γ ) to be
the first time t ≤ T such that Ct ≥ γ if such a time exists, otherwise let T (γ ) = T .
By the optional stopping theorem (Doob, 1953, Theorem 2.1), E[CT (γ ) ] = 1 .
Clearly, if max1≤ s ≤t Cs ≥ γ then CT (γ ) ≥ γ , hence P (max1≤ s ≤t Cs ≥ γ ) ≤ P (CT (γ ) ≥ γ ) .
Since CT (γ ) is nonnegative, P (CT (γ ) ≥ γ ) ≤ E[CT (γ ) ] / γ = 1/ γ . Thus we have shown
that

P (max1≤ s ≤t Cs ≥ γ ) ≤ 1/ γ .
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(5)

It follows that any observed sequence c1 , c2 ,..., cT of compound excess returns was
generated with probability at most min1≤t ≤T (1/ ct ) .

Notice the interesting point that the length of the series is immaterial for our test:
what matters is the maximum compound return that was achieved at some point
during the series.

3. Downside risk

It might at first seem counterintuitive that one would need to see a fund
outperform the market by a factor of twenty‐fold in order to be reasonably
confident that the outperformance is “for real.” The reason is that the apparent
outperformance could be driven by a strategy in which the fund loses everything
with positive probability. It is easy to demonstrate a strategy of this nature for
which the CERT bound is tight.

Choose a number γ > 1 , and consider the

following nonnegative martingale with conditional expectation 1

C0 = 1,

P (Ct = γ 1/ T Ct −1 ) = γ −1/ T ,

P (Ct = 0) = 1 − γ −1/ T for 1 ≤ t ≤ T .

(6)

In each period the fund compounds by the factor γ 1/ T with probability γ −1/ T and
crashes with probability 1 − γ −1/ T . It is straightforward to construct a strategy
based on traded options that has exactly this property (Foster and Young, 2007).
For this strategy, the probability that the fund’s compound excess return Ct ever
exceeds γ is precisely 1/ γ .
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Strategies like this are not purely hypothetical; as we have previously noted, it
may be optimal for a manager with no skill to place investment bets that clean out
his fund with positive probability. However, it would be easier for investors to
infer positive alpha from a given series of returns if the manager could
demonstrate that the fund is not going to be cleaned out. In other words, if the
manager can demonstrably limit the downside risk ‐‐ say through the purchase
of an insurance policy – then the criterion in CERT is less demanding.

To be concrete, suppose that the manager can guarantee that, in each period his
fund will never decrease by more than some fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of the
corresponding market portfolio (assuming both have the same value at the start
of the period). In effect the manager is restricting himself to martingales M t that
have expectation 1 and satisfy the lower bound M t ≥ 1 − φ .

Consider the martingale M tφ ≡ ( M t − 1 + φ ) / φ . This is nonnegative and has
expectation 1. Hence the earlier argument shows that

P[max1≤t ≤T φ −t ∏ ( M s − 1 + φ ) ≥ γ ] ≤ 1/ γ .

(7)

1≤ s ≤t

It follows that if the fractional loss in each period (relative to the market
portfolio) can be limited to φ , then the null hypothesis can be rejected at the level

p = min1≤t ≤T φ t [ ∏ ( M s − 1 + φ )]−1 .
1≤ s ≤t

7

(8)

It is straightforward to show that this bound is tight by investing 1 − φ of the
fund in a risk‐free asset at the start of each period.

Note that the smaller the

downside risk φ , the more modest the returns M s can be and still meet a given
level of confidence.

4. Gaming the t‐test

We have already pointed out that investment strategies with a small probability
of large losses are not just theoretical constructs, but are actually encouraged by
the fees they can deliver for fund managers. Unfortunately the most common
technique for estimating alpha – the t‐test – can give totally misleading results
against strategies of this type.

We can illustrate this point with the previous example showing that the CERT
bound is tight. Fix γ > 1 and a number of periods T . There exists an options
trading strategy such that, with probability 1/ γ , the manager delivers a
multiplicative excess return equal

to γ 1/T in every period 1 ≤ t ≤ T without

crashing. Assume for simplicity that the risk‐free rate is a constant r > 0 . Then
with probability 1/ γ the fund’s value grows by the factor γ 1/T (1 + r ) for T
successive periods. For the sake of argument, assume that there is some small
variation around this growth rate (say due to a noisy execution of the strategy),
so that the period‐by‐period returns are nearly but not quite constant. Then the
regression approach to estimating alpha (see expression (1)) will yield the
estimates βˆ = 0 and αˆ = (γ 1/ T − 1) with almost no variability and therefore an
extremely large value of t. (Beta is zero because, by construction, the returns are
completely uncorrelated with the market.) The t‐test would therefore lead us to
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conclude that the manager’s alpha is positive at an extremely high level of
significance. But this is not the correct conclusion. The problem is that we have
not seen enough data to capture the possibility that the fund could lose a large
amount of money.

To be concrete, suppose that we observe a fund’s quarterly returns over ten
years, so that T = 40 . Imagine that our manager is gaming the investor using the
martingale construction in (6) with parameters γ = 2, r = .01, T = 40 . Such a fund
appears to be delivering alpha equal to 1.01(21/ 40 − 1) ± ε or about 1.77% every
quarter, where ε represents a small “tremble” in the execution of the strategy.
These returns would appear to be very convincing if we estimate alpha using the
t‐test. The analysis in section 3 shows, however, that such a series can be
generated with probability one‐half. Therefore in reality we can only be 50%
confident that alpha is positive.

5. Power and leverage

We have argued that CERT protects the investor against distributions that can be
manufactured by a fund manager in order to lure investors into thinking that he
can generate positive alpha when in fact he cannot.

It might be objected,

however, that trying to protect investors against all possible distributions leads
to an overly conservative test. In this section we shall argue that this is not the
case.

Suppose we knew in advance that a manager’s strategy generates returns that
conform to the assumptions of a standard model, such as lognormality and
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independence. Armed with this knowledge, we could conduct an optimal test of
significance, which in this case would be a t‐test on the logged returns. We claim
that our test (CERT) involves only a modest loss of power compared to this
optimal test, and has the advantage that it applies whenever the returns form a
nonnegative martingale.

Assume that the fund manager is generating compound “excess” returns Ct ≥ 0
relative to the market portfolio, where Ct can be represented in continuous time
by a Brownian motion of form

dCt = μ Ct dt + σ Ct dWt .

(9)

Then Ct is lognormally distributed:

log Ct ∼ N (( μ − σ 2 / 2)t , σ 2t ) .

(10)

The null hypothesis is that μ = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is that μ > 0 . An
unknown is how much variance σ 2 the manager’s strategy involves; this will
depend on how much leverage he uses, which we shall assume cannot be
observed. (The investor is interested in whether μ = 0 or μ > 0 , not in the size of
the variance per se. The reason is that, by adding a sufficiently small amount of
the fund to his existing portfolio, he adds little variance but increases its expected
return (provided μ > 0 ).)
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Consider an investor who is using CERT and significance level p ∈ (0,1) to decide
He observes a series c1 , c2 ,..., cT at discrete time

whether to reject the null.

intervals and rejects if and only if the largest, say ct , satisfies

log ct ≥ log(1/ p ) .

By assumption, Z t =

log Ct + (σ 2 / 2)t

σ t

(11)

is N (0,1) . Hence the investor rejects the null

provided that

Zt ≥

log(1/ p ) + (σ 2 / 2)t
.
σ t

(12)

Of course, the manager wants the investor to reject, because in this case the
investor accepts the alternative, which is that the manager is able to deliver
excess returns. Hence the worst case for the investor arises when the manager
has no skill ( μ = 0) and chooses σ to minimize the right‐hand side of (12). This
occurs when σ =

2 log(1/ p)

t

, in which case (12) becomes

Z t ≥ 2 log(1/ p ) .

(13)

It follows that the critical value for CERT at significance level p is

c p = 2 log(1/ p) .
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(14)

Let us now compare this with the optimal test, which in this case is the z‐test.
(We assume there is enough data so that the normal can be used instead of the t‐
distribution.) Letting Φ denote the cumulative normal distribution, the critical
value at level p for the z‐test is

z p = Φ −1 (1 − p ) .

(15)

It can be shown that, for every p ∈ (0,1) , z p < c p , that is, CERT is more
conservative than the z‐test. We shall now show that when p is small, the loss in
power L( p) is quite modest.

By definition, L( p) is the maximum probability that, for some value μ > 0 , the
z‐test would reject the null when CERT would accept:

L( p) ≡ max μ P( z p ≤ Z t + μ < c p ) = 2Φ (.5(c p − z p )) − 1 .

(16)

Claim. lim p →0 L( p ) = 0 .

Proof. When z is large the right tail of the normal distribution has the following
approximation (Feller, 1971, p.193):

e− z / 2
P(Z ≥ z ) ≈
.
z 2π
2

(17)

Therefore when p is reasonably small, say p ≤ .01 , we have the approximation
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z p ≈ 2 log z p + 2 log(2π / p ) .

(18)

Combining (14) and (18) we find, after some manipulation, that

cp − z p ≈

log z p + .5log(2π )
2 π 2 log(1/ p )

≤

log c p + .5log(2π )
2c p π

.

(19)

Hence c p − z p → 0+ as p → 0+ , which establishes the claim.

Figure 1 shows the power loss function L( p) . Note that the loss in power is only
about 30% when p = .01 .

Figure 1. Power loss function L( p) .
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6. A portfolio test

The test described above is for returns generated by a single fund. In practice,
investors may want to identify those funds within a given set of funds that
generated positive alpha with high probability. This is a considerably more
difficult problem. To illustrate, suppose that we can observe the returns for each
of n funds over the same timeframe t = 1, 2,..., T . Let Cti be the compound excess
return for fund i through period t . Suppose that we observe a particular fund,
say i * , whose returns are sufficiently high that we would reject the null at the
5% level using CERT. This does not mean we have 95% confidence that fund i *
is generating positive alpha. Suppose, in fact, that none of the n funds is able to
generate positive alpha and that the excess returns are stochastically
independent.

It is straightforward to construct n independent nonnegative

martingales, each with expectation 1, such that on average there will be .05n
funds that exceed the critical threshold c.05 . For example, out of 1000 funds there
will, on average, be 50 funds that pass the single‐fund threshold even though
none of the funds is actually generating positive alpha.

More generally, suppose that we observe n nonnegative martingales Cti ,1 ≤ i ≤ n ,
over the periods 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Let the null hypothesis H 0 be that E[Cti | c1i ,..., cti−1 ] = 1
for all i and for all t , where the Cti are assumed to be independent across i for
each t . By the martingale maximal inequality we know that

∀c > 0,

P (max1≤t ≤T Cti ≥ c) ≤ c .

Hence
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(20)

∀c > 0,

P (max1≤i ≤ n max1≤t ≤T Cti ≥ c) ≤ n / c .

(21)

It follows that, to reject H 0 at level p > 0, there must exist one or more funds i such
that

max1≤t ≤T Cti > n / p .

(22)

This is known as the Bonferroni test. The idea is quite general and applies to any
situation in which multiple hypothesis tests are being conducted (Miller, 1981).

One limitation of the Bonferroni test, however, is that it lacks power when the
returns are not independent. This will be the case, for example, if fund managers
exhibit herding behavior in their choice of investment strategy. Here we propose
a different test that is simple to conduct and has considerable power whether or
not the returns are correlated.

Portfolio excess return test (PERT). Consider a family of n funds, where each fund i
generates a series of compound excess returns c1i , c2i ,..., cTi over T periods. Create a
portfolio consisting of equal amounts invested initially in each of the funds.

The

portfolio’s compound return series is given by ct = (1/ n) ∑ cti , 1 ≤ t ≤ T . The probability
1≤ i ≤ n

that none of the fund managers is able to generate positive alpha is at most

min1≤t ≤T (1/ ct ) .
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The proof is more or less immediate.

Each of the n funds generates a

nonnegative martingale of excess returns Cti that may nor may not be
independent across funds. The investor’s portfolio is the nonnegative martingale

Ct = (1/ n) ∑ Cti .

The assumption that none of the managers can generate

1≤ i ≤ n

positive alpha implies that the conditional expectation of Ct equals 1 in every
period. The conclusion follows at once from the martingale maximal inequality.

We note that this test is at least as powerful as the Bonferroni test even when the
returns are independent among funds. Indeed, the Bonferroni test rejects only if
some realization satisfies cti > n / p . But in this event ct > 1/ p , which implies that
the portfolio test rejects also.

7. Application to stock market investing

We illustrate the approach by evaluating two different strategies for investing in
the stock market. The first is a hypothetical strategy that by assumption delivers
small but positive excess returns in each period. The second is a strategy called
TEAM (Target Equity Allocation Management) that was first proposed by Gerth
(1999).

In the first example we shall assume that the returns are normally and

independently distributed, so that standard methods like the t‐test apply. We
show that in this case CERT yields similar answers to the t‐test: both tests concur
that alpha is positive at a high level of significance (which is correct because by
assumption the strategy has positive alpha). In the second example (TEAM), the
excess returns turn out to be highly correlated and are not normally distributed.
Thus the TEAM strategy produces returns that are outside the scope of the usual
modeling assumptions for the t‐test but are within the domain of CERT.
16

To set the stage for these examples, let us briefly review certain features of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which provides a general method for
assessing the quality of investments (see for example Berndt (1996) or Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)). Let rt f denote the risk‐free rate in period t , rt m the
return from the market portfolio, and rt p the return from a hypothetical managed
portfolio. The model posits that the managed portfolio’s excess return rt p − rt f can
be written as a multiple, beta, of the excess return generated by the market,

rt m − rt f , plus a martingale difference ε t :

rt p − rt f = α + β (rt m − rt f ) + ε t , E[ε t | ε t −1 , ε t − 2 ,...ε1 ] = 0 .

The multiplier β

(23)

is the covariance between returns on the market and the

managed portfolio, divided by the variance of the excess returns, that is,

β = Cov(rt p − rt f , rt m − rt f ) / Var (rt m − rt f ) .

(24)

If the managed portfolio generates positive alpha relative to the market ( α > 0 ),
then by taking some funds out of the market and putting them into the portfolio
we could diversify our investments and earn a strictly higher return with no
increase in risk. Thus it is of considerable interest to know whether α is positive
or not.

The standard way to test for positive α is to estimate (23) using a series of
returns and apply the t‐test to the intercept. This approach is valid provided the
errors are i.i.d. normal.

For our first example, we simulated a hypothetical
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investment strategy that by assumption has positive alpha and normally
distributed errors, namely, α = 0.01, β = 1.0, ε t ∼ N (0, 0.102 ). Thus, on average, the
strategy generates alpha of 1% per month with a variance of 1%.1 For the market
returns we used the actual monthly returns for the S&P 500 from January 1926
through December 2007, that is, n = 984 months. The risk‐free rate was assumed
to be the interest rate on US Treasury bills in each month.

We ran 10,000 simulations and compared the outcome of the t‐test and CERT at
the 5% level of significance, with the null hypothesis α = 0 .

For a given

simulation, the t‐test rejects the null at the 5% level if the estimated value, of α
divided by the estimate of the standard error, exceeds 1.65. (Here the number of
degrees of freedom is so large that the t is effectively the normal.) By contrast,
CERT rejects the null if the compound value of the simulated fund exceeds the
compound value of the S&P 500 by at least 20‐fold at some time during the run.

Since the null hypothesis is false, each test should reject with high probability,
which is the case as Table 1 shows. More importantly, the two tests yield quite
similar results: the tests render the same verdict over 92% of the time. Figure 2
illustrates the same point in a different way, namely, the empirical distributions
of p‐values for the two tests are quite similar. This is rather surprising given that
CERT holds almost independently of the assumed distribution of returns, which
is certainly not the case with the t‐test.

By assuming that the variance equals the mean, there is no incentive to leverage the investment
strategy, that is, the growth rate is optimized when β = 1 .

1
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CERT
Accept
Accept 1026

Reject
180

t‐test
Reject

572

8222

Table 1. Rejection and acceptance of the null (α = 0) by the t‐test and CERT when
the true distribution of alpha is α = 0.01, β = 1.0, ε t ∼ N (0, 0.102 ). 10,000 simulated
runs, each of 984 periods.

Figure 2. Distribution of p‐values under the t‐test and CERT for 10,000 simulated
runs each of 984 periods.
We now consider a second investment strategy in which the t‐test turns out to be
quite inappropriate but CERT is still applicable. This strategy, known as TEAM,
was first proposed by Gerth (1999), and is discussed in a subsequent article by
Agnew (2002). Divide discrete time periods t into successive subsequences, each
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of length n. A subsequence of time periods will be called an epoch. At the start of
each epoch i, the TEAM strategy targets an amount Si to be invested in stock,
with the remainder held in cash (i.e., Treasury bills). At the end of each period t
within epoch i, funds are moved between the stock account and the cash account
so that the amount in stock at the start of the (t + 1) st period is (1 + rt f ) times the
amount at the start of the t th period. Thus if rt m < rt f money is moved from cash
to stock, and if rt m > rt f money is moved from stock to cash. At the end of the
epoch, the value of the TEAM portfolio is Si ∑ (rt m − rt f ) plus terms that are of
t

much smaller magnitude.

Lowering the target Si reduces the volatility of the returns, while raising the
target increases the volatility. Gerth proves that if stocks have returns that are
independent and identically distributed (not necessarily normal), and if the risk‐
free rate of return is constant, then there exists a choice of targets such that
TEAM yields the same level of volatility as any given mixture of stocks and cash,
and has a strictly higher expected return.

There is no guarantee, of course, that these assumptions hold in practice. Our
purpose, however, is not to critique the TEAM approach, but to use it as a test
case on which to apply our theory.

Suppose that some fund manager had

actually used TEAM to manage his portfolio over the period 1926‐2007. Could
we conclude that he generated positive alpha given the realized returns from the
market over this same period?

Following Gerth, let us evaluate the specific TEAM strategy in which epochs are
five years long, funds are re‐allocated at the end of each year, and the target at
20

the start of each epoch is to put 70% in stock. This results in 14 epochs over the
period 1926‐2007. We compute the excess returns from TEAM in each of these 14
epochs and regress them against the excess returns generated by the market. The
OLS estimate of alpha is αˆ = 0.000319 with standard error 0.000904, so the t‐
statistic is .353, which has a p‐value of about 0.35. Thus the null ( α = 0 ) cannot
be rejected with much confidence.2

Unfortunately the t‐test is not appropriate, because the residuals are not
independent nor are they identically distributed, as one can see from Figure 3.

Figure 3. Scatterplot of residuals from regressing TEAM excess returns versus
S&P 500 excess returns, January 1926‐December 2007.

Gerth (1999) made no claim that his strategy does produce positive returns relative to the
market; rather, he argued that under certain conditions it will produce higher returns than a
mixture of the market and cash.

2
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In such a case CERT is a more appropriate test; moreover it is easy to compute.
Figure 4 shows the compound excess return from TEAM relative to the
compound returns from the market over the period January 1926‐December
2007. It is evident that the series gets nowhere near the factor of 20 required to
show that α ≠ 0 at the 95% confidence level. Indeed, the maximum ratio is less
than 2, so we cannot be at all confident that this version of TEAM generates
positive alpha compared to the market. Thus, in this case, the t‐test and CERT
yield similar p‐values that do not permit rejection of the null hypothesis, but
CERT is the more appropriate test because the much stronger distributional
assumptions required for the t‐test are not met.

Figure 4. Compound excess returns of TEAM strategy divided by compound
excess returns of the S&P 500, January 1926‐December 2007.
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